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by
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and
DAVID SAPONARO
ABSTRACT
This thesis reviews bond rating agencies and the
effects of a rating change on security prices.
Our research consists of six chapters. Chapter I
gives a general overview of rating agencies and their
function in the financial markets. Chapters II and III
review the financial and non-financial criteria used by
the various bond rating agencies as well as perceived
differences among them. Finally, Chapters IV and V
analyze the effects of bond rating changes on both bond
and common stock prices.
Since results of previous studies concerning the
informational value of rating changes are conflicting, we
have conducted our own study to calculate unexpected
common stock returns in reaction to bond rating changes.
Our study, while limited in scope to below investment
grade companies, concludes that opportunities may exist
for profitable common stock trading based upon bond rating
reclassifications. Further studies are warranted in order
to determine specifically which sectors of the bond market
provide these opportunities.
Thesis Supervisor:
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Paul Healy
Associate Professor of Accounting
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CHAPTER 1
BOND RATING AGENCIES:
WHO ARE THE PLAYERS AND WHAT IS THEIR PURPOSE?
Debt financing is a primary method used by
corporations to raise cash for their operations, in which
the corporation (the borrower) issues bonds to investors.
The basic bond is a long-term contractual I.O.U., usually
in excess of ten years, for which the corporation agrees
to pay to bondholders specified interest ("coupon")
payments each year and then redeem the principal borrowed
on the maturity date. The purpose of bond rating agencies
is to provide an unbiased, independent judgment of the
riskiness of this bond investment regarding the issuing
company's ability to meet its principal and interest
payments.
1.1 WHO ARE THE BOND RATING AGENCIES
The two most prominent bond rating agencies are
Moody's Investors Service (a subsidiary of Dun &
Bradstreet), and Standard & Poors Corporation (a wholly
owned subsidiary of McGraw-Hill, Inc.). These agencies
rate all corporate bond issues as well as certain private
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placements, municipal bond issues, government issues,
preferred stock, commercial paper, and some large debt
offerings of foreign companies and governments. These
rating agencies provide investors with a regular and
consistent record of their opinions on the quality and
riskiness of these debt issues. Other prominent bond
rating agencies include Duff & Phelps, Fitch Investor
Service, and McCarthy, Chrisanti & Maffei. These five
rating agencies represent the only agencies currently
recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Moody's Investor Service is the oldest of the rating
agencies. John Moody published the first ratings of bonds
in his Analysis of Railroad Investments in 1909. He later
followed with the ratings of municipals as well as tax
exempt issues in 1919.1/ Moody's debt ratings are based
on a letter designation, with Aaa representing the highest
quality bond and C representing the lowest quality bonds.
See Exhibit 1.1 for a complete breakdown of the ratings.
Standard and Poors began rating securities in 1941,
following a merger of Poors Publishing Company and
Standards Statistic Company. Freeman Putney Jr. first
developed S&P's corporate bond rating system in 1916,
while working for Poor's Publishing Company. S&P's
ratings system also follows a letter coded system, with
-7-
F I ae 1
KEY TO MOODY'S CORPORATE RATINGS
Aaa
Bonds which are rated Aaa are judged to be of the best qualty. They carry the
smallest degree of nvestment risk and are generally referred to as "gilt edge."
Interest payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally stable margin
and principal is secure. While the various protective elements are likely to
change, such changes as can be visualized are mcst unlikety to impair the
fundamentally strong position of such :ssues.
Aa
Bonds which are rated Aa are judged to be of high quality by all standards
Together with the Aaa group they comprise what are generally known as high
grade bonds They are rated lower than the best bonds because margins of
protection may not be as large as in Aaa securities or fluctuation of protective
elements rray be of greater amplitude or there may be other elements present
which make the long term risks appear somewhat larger than n Aaa securities.
A
Bonds which are rated A possess many favorable investment attributes and
are to be considered as upper medium grade obligations Factors giving security
to princ:pa! and interest are considered adequate but eement, may be present
which suggest a susceptblity to impairment sometime n the future.
Baa
Bonds which are rated Baa are considered as medium grace obligatons e
they are neither highly protected nor poorly secured. Interest payments and
principal security appear adequate for the present but certain protect:ve
elements may be lacking or ray be characteristcally unreliable over any great
lengtn of time. Such bonds lack outstanding investment characteristics and In
fact have speculative characteristics as well.
Ba
Bonds which are rated Ba are judged to have speculative elements. their
future cannot be considered as well assured. Often the protection of Interest and
principal payments may be very moderate and thereby not well safeguarded
during both good and bad times over the future Uncertainty of position
characterizes bonds n this class.
B
Bonds which are rated B generally lack character:stics of the desirable
Investment Assurance of nterest and principal payments or of maintenance of
other terms of the contract over any long period of time may be small
Caa
Bonds which are rated Caa are of poor standing Such ssues may be in
default or there may be present elements of dangerwth respect to principal or
interest.
Ca
Bonds which are rated Ca represent obligations which are speculative n a
hign egree i,jcn issues are cten in deta,.it or nave ther marked sncrtcomings.
C
Bonds which are rated C are the lowest rated class of bonds and issues so
rated can be regarded as having extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any
real investment standing.
Note: Moody's applies numerical modifiers. 1, 2 and 3 n each generic rating
classification from Aa through B in Its corporate bond rating system The
modifier I indicates that the security ranks in the higher end of its generic rating
category: the modifier 2 indicates a mid-range ranking and the md:fier 3
indicates that the issue ranks in the lower end of ts generic rating category.
STANDARD & POOR'S
DEBT
A Standard & Poor's corporate or munrca! debt ring is a curren assessment
of the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a speci:fc cb, caton This
assessment rrmay take into consideraton ob!igors such as guarantors. Insurers.
or lessees.
The debt rating s not a recommendation to purchase. sell or hold a security.inasmuch as it does not comment as to market price or su:tzbily for a par':cuiar
investor.
The raings are based on current informaton furnished by the Issuer or obtaned
by Standard & Poo'rs from other sources it considers reliabie Standard & Poor s
does not perform any audit in connection with any rating and may on occasion.
rely on unaudited financia informnabon. The ratngs may be chancec. ssoenced
or withdrawn as a result of changes n, or unavailability of. such information.
or for other circumstances.
The ratings are based. in varying degrees, on the following consderations:
I. Likelihood of default-capacty and willingness of the obligor as to the timelypayment of interest and repayment of principal n accordance with the
terms of the obligation:
11. Nature of and provisions of the obligation:
111. Protection afforded by. and relative position of. the oblication in te event
of bankruptcy reorganization or other arrangement under the laws of
bankruptcy and other laws affecting creditors nghts.
AAA Debt rated AAA has the highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor s.Capacity to pay interest and repay prinnpal Is extremely strong.
AA Debt rated AA has a very strong capacity to pay Interest and repay pnncpal
and differs from the higher rated ssues only In small degree
A Debt rated A has a strong capacity to pay nterest and repay principal
althougn it is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of c.anges in
crcumstances and economic conditions than debt In higher rated categories.
P.1 Debt rated BBB is regarded as having an aequate capacity to payinterest and repay pnncpaJl. Whereas it normally exhibits adequate protectionparameters. adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are morelikely to lead to a weakened capacrty to pay interest and repay principal for
debt in this category than n higher ated categories
BB, B, CCC, CC Debt rated BB. B. CCC and CC s regarded. on
balance. as precom:nanry specuative w:th respect to cazac:ty to ay Interest
and repay principal In accordance with the terms of the obligation BB Indicates
the lowest degree of speculation and CC the highest degree of speculation.While such cebt will likely have some quality and protective charac:erislcs.
these are outweighed by large uncertainties or major sk exposures to adverse
conditions
C The rating C s reseved for income bonds on which no n!e-est Is being
paid
D Debt rated D is n default. and payment of interest and or repayment of
principal s n arrears
Plus ( + ) or Minus (-): The ratings from "AA" to "8" may be moCfied
by the addi on of a plus or minus sign to show relative stancing within the
major rating categories
Provisional Ratings: The letter p" indicates that the rating s pro-
visional. A provisional rating assumes the successful completion of the project
being financed by the debt being rated and ndicates that payment of debt
service requirements Is largely or entirely dependent upon the successful and
1 timely completion of the project This rating, however, while addresssing credit
Quality subsequent to completion of the protect. makes no comment on thelikelihood of. or the nsk of default upon failure of such completion The Investor
should exercise his own judgment with respect to such likelhood and risk
L The letter "L" indicates that the rating pertains to the principal amount of
those bonds where the underlying deposit collateral s fully nsured by the
Fede4al Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. or the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.
Continuance of the rating is contingent upon S&P's receipt of an executed
copy of the escrow agreement or cosing documentation confirming investments
and cash flows.
NR ndicates that no rating has been requested. that there s insufficient
information on which to base a rating,.or that S&P does not rate a particular
type of obligation as a matter of policy
Debt Obligations ofIssuers outside the United States and its ter-
ritories are ra ed on the same basis as domeslic corporate and municipal
issues. The ratings measure tte creditworthiness of the obligor but do not take
. rnto account currency exchange and related uncertainties
Bond Investment Quality Standards: Under present com-
mercial bank regulations Issued by the Comptroller of the Currency. bonos rated
in the top four categones (AAA. AA. A. BBB. commonly known as "Investment
Grade" ratings) are generally regarded as eligible for bank nvestment. In addition.
the Legal Investment Laws of vaenous tates mpose certain rating or other
standards tot {Oblnllne slnship frrtrvemWth ~v~n :n{tio u
_..w·uu, v. vv......vl.. Clfl. i I ll mllrv!,11 11] Uy ),dV IIjy: UllS:) lUL V3il-panies. insurance companies and fiduciaries generally
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AAA representing the highest quality and D the lowest.
See Exhibit 1.1 for a complete breakdown of S&P ratings.
The remaining rating services have much less stature
and power than do S&P and Moody's, primarily because they
rate fewer bond issues, and fewer investors subscribe to
their publications. Fitch Investor Service is the third
oldest prominent rating agency, established in 1922. It
rates fewer firms than both S&P and Moody's, but is noted
for its special expertise in the rating of banks. Duff &
Phelps is another smaller rating agency based in Chicago.
It is noted for its strengths in the ratings of
utilities. Finally, McCarthy, Chrisanti & Maffei (MCM)
was the most recent firm to gain SEC recognition and it
has grown rapidly since it began rating bonds in 1979.
MCM is unique because it is the only rating service not to
derive any revenues from the companies it rates.
Besides these established rating agencies, many large
institutional investors have developed their own
"in-house" rating systems for which they analyze debt
issues for their own credit specifications. Specific
characterisitics of the various rating agencies will be
addressed in Chapter 3.
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1.2 WHY ARE FAVORABLE BOND RATINGS SO IMPORTANT
One reason that favorable bond ratings are so
important is because of the strong correlation between the
bond's rating and its yield to maturity. The lower the
bond rating, the higher the bond's yield to maturity has
proven to be. Exhibit 1.3 shows the yield average by
rating (Moody's) for industrial corporate bonds and public
utilities. For new issues of bonds, these ratings are
particularly important because the rating assigned to the
bond may ultimately determine the coupon or interest
payment the corporation will have to pay on its bond
issue. Studies have indicated, however, that it is not
the bond rating itself but rather the financial condition
of the company that truly determines interest cost. In
other words, the official bond rating assigned by one of
the agencies is merely a "rubber stamp" of what is already
perceived in the financial markets.
Another related reason for the importance of a good
rating is that assigned ratings have historically proven
to be good predictors of default. In an early study,
Hickman (1958) estimated the percentage of bonds in each
rating category which subsequently defaulted. The sample
he used incorporated all rated corporate bonds between
1940 and 1943 (see Exhibit 1.4).2/
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Exhibit 1.3
Yield Average by Ratings
INDUSTRIALS
Aaa Aa A Baa
6.97 7.11 7.36 7.99
7.78 7.40 7.63 8.07
8.42 8.64 8.90 9.14
8.61 8.90 9.21 10.26
8.23 8.59 8.88 9.67
7.86 8.04 8.36 8.87
8.58 8.74 8.94 9.35
9.39 9.65 9.91 10.42
11.57 11.99 12.44 13.39
13.70 14.19 14.62 15.48
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Aaa Aa A Baa
7.46 7.60 7.72 8.17
7.60 7.72 7.84 8.17
8.71 9.04 9.50 9.84
9.03 9.44 10.09 10.96
8.63 8.92 9.29 9.82
8.19 8.43 8.61 9.06
8.87 9.10 9.29 9.62
9.86 10.22 10.49 10.96
12.30 13.00 13.34 13.95
14.64 15.30 15.95 16.60
Source: Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Corporate Bond Yield
Averages by Ratings.
Years
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
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Exhibit 1.4
Rating Category Default Rate
Aaa 5.9
Aa 6.0
A 13.4
Baa 19.1
Ba-C 42.4
As this table shows, less than 12% of bonds rated in the
top two categories subsequently defaulted. Many
investment firms are restricted in their investment
guidelines with respect to quality. For example, many
insurance companies restrict their holdings of below
investment grade (below Baa rating) debt issues to less
than 20% of the portfolio. The significance, then, of a
lower rating is that is may inhibit the marketability of
the issue.
As one can see, bond ratings are ultimately useful for
investors, borrowers, investment banks, and bond traders.
Debt issuing companies (borrowers) are provided a
certification of the quality and riskiness of their debt
obligations. Investors are provided a low-cost assessment
of bond quality for which they can analyze the risk-return
relationship and investment value. Investment bankers and
bond traders utilize the bond ratings to determine their
marketing strategy when matching issuers and investors.
Overall, the importance that bond ratings have in the
financial community is unquestioned.
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Given the importance of bond ratings, Lee Wakeman
provides an excellent summary of the function and
importance of the bond rating agencies:
The rating agencies, then, by analyzing the
company's statements at the time of issue and
by offering an independent judgment of the new
bond's risk provide an initial low-cost
assessment of the credit standing of the
issuing company. Furthermore, the rating
services have a comparative advantage in
monitoring the changing position of the bond
vis-a-vis the company over time. Provided with
these services, which in turn offer investors
both information and greater assurance about
future management actions, companies continue
to pay rating agencies to have their bonds
rated, and to have their performance
monitored. The use of Moody's or S&P's is thus
a cost-effective strategy which increases the
net proceeds of the debt issue to the issuing
company.3/
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CHAPTER 2
THE RATINGS PROCESS AND CRITERIA
In this section we will discuss the rating process
along with the analysis and methodology the rating
agencies use to determine their ratings. We will first
digress briefly to discuss the various features contained
in debt issues that are considered in the ratings analysis.
2.1 THE RATING PROCESS
A bond contract is basically a legal agreement between
the issuing firm, the bondholders, and the trustee who is
chosen to represent the bondholders. The contract
includes a stated coupon payment, interest payment
schedule, and maturity date. Other features which may be
of consideration include sinking fund payments, whether
the loan is collateralized (mortgage bonds) or unsecured,
the underlying assets involved, as well as any restrictive
covenants. n determining a rating, these various
covenants and provisions are each carefully considered in
assessing the issuing company's abil4ty to meet its
obligations.
-14-
The bond rating process does not differ significantly
among the major bond rating agencies. The first step in
any bond rating occurs when the issuing organization
approaches a rating agency and requests a rating for its
bond issue. Often corporations will approach S&P or
Moody's prior to the registration of a public debt issue
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This will
enable the company to receive an indication of what that
rating might be, and thus its approximate interest
expense. The rating agency then assigns an analytical
team to the issue which will collect and analyze all
relevant external and internal information necessary. The
team may also interview both management and employees to
clarify any uncertainties they may have. At S&P, the
issuing company is often requested to give a formal
presentation to include the following information:
-- financial comparisons with similar companies;
-- the company's five-year historical operating
records and all relevant financial statements;
-- analysis of capital spending;
-- any other key factors which the issuer believes
may impact the rating.
After a thorough analysis, the rating team will assign
a tentative rating. Most rating agencies will then
contact the investment banker or the issuing company's
-15-
management with the rating committee's tentative rating
decision and the reasons for that decision. Often they
will give the company a chance to address any of the
uncertainties. Shortly thereafter, an official rating is
assigned. This new rating is then entered into an ongoing
monitoring and surveillance system of the rating agency.
A formal review is made annually. However, analysts are
constantly monitoring situations and in most cases, rating
changes emanate from the surveillance aspect of the
agencies review activity.
Moody's and S&P charge the issuing corporation a fee
for this service ranging from $1000 to 50,000 depending
upon the time and analysis involved. Subscribers to the
service then pay a nominal fee to receive monthly
publications of all rated public debt.
Also included ia the surveillance aspect of S&P's
service is CreditWatch. When an analyst becomes aware of
a particular event or new development which could affect a
particular company's rating, S&P will then place the issue
on "CreditWatch" until a final determination is made.
Most other rating agencies provide similar services. A
listing on CreditWatch does not necessarily mean that a
rating change is inevitable. Investors who subscribe to
these services are notified in monthly publications or via
-16-
telerate services of each rating change or "CreditWatch"
announcement.
2.2 RATINGS CRITERIA
In the final determination of a bond rating, rating
agencies perform a wide variety of quantitative as well as
qualitative analyses on a company's ability to meet its
debt obligations. Because this analysis is quite similar
in nature among the different rating agencies, we will
extensively review criteria evaluated at Standard &
Poors. The ratings criteria and evaluations made are
often the same at Moody's or any of the smaller services;
unfortunately, S&P is the only agency which publicly
provides information concerning the factors which they
consider. Standard and Poors Credit Overview was the
primary source of the following information.
S&P makes the following comments of its ratings
philosophy:
(1) In the analytical experience, we are
constantly reminded that the past is less
and less prologue to the future.
(2) In determining a rating, both quantitative
and qualitative analyses are employed. The
judgment is qualitative in nature and the
role of the quantitative analysis is to
make the best possible overall qualitative
judgment because, ultimately, a rating is
an opinion. (emphasis added).-
-17-
As an example of the vast information considered, we
will review some of the criteria S&P utilize in the
ratings of utilities. Rather than extensively review the
specific details which S&P considers, we will attempt to
outline the factors considered and then briefly explain
them.
2.2.1. Non-financial Criteria
The six non-financial criteria which S&P analyzes
requires a qualitative assessment encompassing the
economic, social, and political trends affecting utility
operations:
1) market or service territory
2) fuel/power supply
3) operating efficiency
4) regulatory treatment
5) management
6) competition/monopoly balance
(1) Market or Service Territory
A. General
a. Size and growth rate of market
b. Economic trends
c. Diversity of customer base
d. Demand components
e. Dependencies
-18-
f. Per capita income
g. Area ratings
h. Customer growth
i. Other
This category in the ratings criteria examines the
strength of long-term market demand for utility products
or services. Specific items addressed include the size
and growth rate of the market, diversity of the customer
base, and its economic strength. Also examined is the
utility's ability to provide service from both legal and
competitive perspectives. For example, an electric
utility company's ability to provide service can be
affected by the legal definition of its territorial and
customer class franchise. For telephone utilities, the
effects of the AT&T breakup and its implications for
market structure are carefully analyzed.
2) Fuel/Power Supply
A. For electric utilities
a. Fuel mix
b. Fuel contracts
c. Reserve margin
d. Reliability
e. Environmental factors
f. Transmission capability
g. Power purchases/power sales
h. Other
-19-
B. For gas pipelines and distributors
a. Long-term supply adequacy
b. Non-traditional sources such as liquid natural gas
c. Reserve capacity
d. Gas supply diversification.
An analysis of the present and potential fuel and
power supply is of major importance to utilities
analysis. For electric utilities, consideration is given
to both the diversification and flexibility in the use of
fuels, as well as the assurance of adequate supply and
deliveries of the fuel over the long term. The objective
in this analysis is to determine the extent to which the
prospective utility will be exposed to fuel pricing
shocks, delivery disruptions, and the need for additional
base load capacity. The proper assessment of current and
expected future capacity is also a leading indicator of
prospective funding needs. In addition, vertical
integraton of fuel and power generation activities is
considered, because its absence may indicate potential
vulnerability to outside factors which management cannot
control.
3) Operating Efficiency
A. Electric Utilities
a. Peak load and capacity factors
b. Environmental problems
c. Generating plant availability
-20-
d. Plant outages
e. Kilowatt per hour pricing
B. Gas Pipeline and Distributors
a. Plant utilization
b. Storage adequacy
c. Lost and unaccounted gas
d. Non-gas operating costs
C. Telephone Utilities
a. General office modernization
b. Maintenance costs
c. Trouble repairs
d. Public Service Commission complaints
e. held orders and service levels
In analyzing operating efficiency, S&P evaluates each
utility in terms of operations cost and quality. S&P
analysts attempt to identify those parts of operations
which may need improvements in terms of time and/or cost
of resources utilized in production. Modernization and
upgrade potential of existing facilities is carefully
analyzed. For each of the different types of utility, the
different factors considered are outlined above.
4) Regulatory Treatment
A. Earnable Returns on Equity
B. Regulatory Quality
a. Quality of earnings
b. Aids to cash flow
-21-
C. Regulatory Timing
a. Earnings stabilization techniques
b. Accounting standards
c. Forecasted rate bases
Deregulation within the utility industry can have a
tremendous influence upon earnings of particular
companies. Because of this, S&P analysts meet regularly
with the various utility commissions which govern utility
regulation. Input from these meetings as well as from
rate adjustment proposals are carefully evaluated in terms
of their impact upon the prospective utility's earnings.
The first step in analyzing a utility's regulatory
environment is to determine which state and federal
agencies govern operations. Besides utility commissions,
environmental commissions, securities commissions, and
safety commissions can all influence operating efficiency
and therefore may affect the creditworthiness of a
particular utility. As an example, many utilities with
nuclear power plant exposure have been negatively affected
by newly imposed safety restrictions on both the
construction and operation of nuclear power plants.
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5) Management
A. Strategic and Financial Planning
B. Results and Commitments
C. Public and Private Priorities
D. Effective Communication with the Public, Regulatory
Bodies, and the Financial Community
E. Financial Controls and Policies
F. Business Philosophy
S&P places a tremendous emphasis on the quality of
management in determining a rating. Its judgments are
based primarily upon management's demonstrated commitment
to a given level of credit quality, as reflected in
operational and financial track record. In addition, S&P
looks for well-structured planning for the future
including contingency options which demonstrate
flexibility. A thoughtful balance of public and private
priorities, along with a demonstrated credibility and
effective management communication with the public,
regulatory agencies, and the financial community is
considered essential. Meetings with management are
conducted to complement statement analysis. These
meetings are most useful for the candid interpretation of
recent developments and more importantly, these meetings
provide management an opportLity to discuss its goals,
objectives, and strategies with S&P analysts.
-23-
6) Competition/Monopoly Balance
A. Relative Exposure to Competition
B. Gas Utilities and Alternate Fuel Costs
C. Telephone Utilities and Other Common Carriers and
Equipment Suppliers
D. Electric Utilities and Competitive Energy Sources
E. Move to Diversify
F. Diversification Risks and Financial Policies
In general, public utilities face very little
competition, and for the most part, act much like a
monopolist with the bulk of products and services subject
to direct "rate of return" price regulation. However,
there has been a recent trend to allow certain utilities
to diversify into non-utility, non-regulated, business
lines. Wherever non-utility exposure exists, S&P analysts
assess the degree of business risk inherent in that
particular non-utility operation and ultimately determine
its effects upon the overall utility financial criteria,
and its ablity to meet debt commitments.
As one can see, the six non-financial criteria
evaluated represent, for the most part, qualitative
judgments on the part of the analysts. For this reason,
it is within these non-financial criteria where most of
the difference in ratings among the various rating
-24-
agencies originates. For example, Moody's and S&P
differed significantly upon their ratings of telephone
utility's during the breakup of AT&T.
2.2.2 Financial Criteria
A variety of financial ratios are utilized by the
various rating agencies in determining their ratings.
Listed below are ratios which are often used in the
ratings process by the various analyses.
A. Liquidity Ratios:
a. Current Current Assets
Ratio Current Liabilities
b. Quick Cash + Short-Term Securities + Accts Receivable
b. Quick Current Liabilities
Ratio Current Liabilities
c. Defensive
Internal
Measure
Cash+Short-Term Securities+Accts. Rec.
Projected Daily Operating Expenditures
B. Leverage/Capital Structure Ratios
a. Long-Term Debt Long-Term Debt
to Equity Shareholders Equity
Total Debt to
Equity Ratio
Times Interest
Earned Ratio
Current iabilities + Long-Term Debt
Shareholder's Equity
I Operating Income
Annual Interest Payments
-25-
C. Profitability Ratios
a. Retaurn = Net Inc.Aft.Tax+Int.Exp.-Tax Ben. of Int.Exp
Asseotsl - ~ ~ Total AssetsAssets
Net Income
b. Return on Equity = Common Shareholder's Equity
c. Expenses to = Expenses (before tax)
Revenue Revenues
D. Turnover Ratios
a. Total Asset = Sales
Turnover Average Total Assets
Accounts Sal
b. Receivable Average (net) Accounts Receivable
Turnover
Inventory Sales
Turnover Average Inventory
Source: Foster, Financial Statement Analysis
These financial ratios are calculated and then compared to
analyze the following characteristics:
1. the firm's ability to meet its short-term
obligations;
2. the firm's capital structure and its overall
ability to meet long-term obligations;
3. the efficiency resulting from the operational use
of its assets; and
4. the profitability and efficiency resulting from
the use of capital.4/
In the final determination of the bond rating, the
analysts will weigh these characteristics against the same
-26-
characteristics of other firms within its industry, as
well as with the overall universe of debt issuers.
In addition to financial ratios, ratings analysts look
at other characteristics which are relevant. To be
consistent, we will outline and summarize other financial
criteria which S&P utilizes in analyzing utilities.
Financial Criteria for Utilities:
I. Construction/Asset Concentration Risks
II. Debt Leverage
III. Earnings Protection
IV. Cash Flow Adequacy
V. Financial Flexibility
VI. Quality of Earnings.
I. Construction/Asset Concentration Risks
a. Nature and Breakdown of Projected Expenditures
b. Projected Cancellations
c. Post-Completion Risks
d. Construction Expenditures to Capitalization Ratio
e. Construction Work in Progress to Capitalization
and Common Equity Ratios.
Within this category, S&P analysts look closely at any
financial risks during a project construction phase as
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well as any risks inherent after project completion. As
an example, in the construction of nuclear power plants,
project cancellations in the relatively early stages are
not uncommon. This can create a significant "dead" asset
on the books and often requires that additional rate
relief be granted. If this is the case, earnings and
asset protection for bondholders is clearly weakened.
Because of the unfortunate consistent record of nuclear
project cancellations, any utilities with significant
investments in these plants have been subject to bond
downgrades.
II. Debt Leverage
a. Debt Ratios
b. Short-Term Debt/Capitalization
c. Off Balance Sheet Liabilities and Commitments
d. Inflated or Undervalued Assets
e. Risk Adjusted Benchmarks
In analyzing a company's debt structure, S&P attempts
to go beyond the balance sheet debt items and incorporate
subtle terms of financial leverage. Non-capitalized
leases, debt guarantees, construction trusts, etc., are
all examples of items which S&P consider hidden financial
leverage. Having determined all potential liabilities,
S&P will then determine appropriate debt benchmarks to
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determine its ratings. For example, debt/total equity
ratio benchmarks look as follows (1982):
AAA AA A BBB
Electric
Utilities Under 45% 42-47% 45-55% over 53%
Gas
Distributors --- under 45% 45-50% over 50%
Gas
Pipelines --- under 40% 40-50% over 50%
Telephone
Companies under 40% 40-48% 48-58%
1II. Earnings Protection
a. Pretax Coverage Ratios
b. Returns on Equity
c. Overall Returns on Capital
The primary tests for earnings adequacy are those
centering upon fixed charge coverage. Ratios such as
E.B.I.T./Interest expense are carefully evaluated. In
this evaluation, S&P analysts develop financial
projections which incorporate all aspects of future
earnings as well as interest expenses. Consideration is
given to both historical as well as comparative pre-tax
coverage ratios in determining the final rating.
Overall, S&P believes that these earnings protection
ratios provide the most direct indication of a company's
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ability to service its debt burden. Because of this, we
believe that the earnings protection criteria of the
rating carries the most weight in the determination of a
final rating. However, as we will address later, S&P
provides no weightings or relevance of these twelve
categories analyzed.
IV. Cash Flow Adequacy
a. Capital Spending Needs
b. Net Cash Flow/Capitalization
c. Refunding Requirements
Because utilities are constantly undergoing
construction or expansion programs, S&P emphasizes
evaluating cash inflows with respect to the usually far
larger burden of funding construction outlays. n order
to determine a utility's level of cash flow adequacy,
various quantitative relationships are examined with
emphasis placed upon cash flow as a percent of cash
capital outlays. Internal funding as a percent of cash
capital outlays is often used as a benchmark in
determining a rating. These benchmarks are as follows, in
1982:
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AAA AA A BBB
Electric
Utilities over 40% 20-50% under 30%
Gas
Distributors over 75% 50-100% under 60%
Telephones over 85X% 70-85% 55-70% 25-55%
V. Financial Flexibility
a. Cash Flow-Capital Requirement Deficiencies
b. Need and Ability to Sell Common Equity
c. Market/Book Value
d. Preferred Stock Ratio
e. Short-term Debt Usage
F. Non-Traditional Financing Resources
In this category, S&P analysts evaluate the utility's
ability to tap both short- and long-term capital markets
on an ongoing basis. Primary focus is placed upon the
particular utility's ability to sell common equity.
Because of this, market to book value ratios are carefully
examined. Other considerations of financial flexibility
considered include the utility's ability to execute lease
financing, establish construction trusts, sell
non-critical assets, and the utility's practices regarding
the uses of short-term debt.
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VI. Quality of Earnings:
a. Regulatory Treatment of:
1. investment tax credits
2. depreciation methods
b. Unbilled Revenues
c. Current Costs vs. Historic Costs
In this final category, analysts evaluate the various
accounting methods used and make comparisons within the
particular industry in terms of quality of earnings. This
examination of the accounting techniques will serve to
reinforce many of the categories previously addressed
including certain regulatory statutes and management
concerns for credit quality.
CONCLUSION
In this section, we have reviewed extensively the
factors incorporated into a bond rating. Overall, the
rating made by the rating agencies appears to be primarily
a qualitative judgment; however, quantitative measures
serve to focus and reinforce this qualitative judgment.
None of the five major rating agencies provide weightings
of the relative importance of various factors considered.
However, it is interesting to note that for the most part,
the various rating agencies analyze the same criteria. It
is differences in their opinions with respect to the
qualitative factors which leads to differences in ratings.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RATING AGENCIES
As we have mentioned in previous sections, the
purpose, process utilized, and factors considered in the
determination of bond ratings are practically the same
within the five major ratings agencies, particularly for
the dominant agencies--Standard & Poors and Moody. For
this reason, we expect that the ratings assigned by these
agencies would be very similar if not equivalent.
Evidence overwhelmingly verifies this; however, minor
differences do occur as a result of differences in
qualitative assessments of particular factors. In this
chapter, we comment upon perceived reputations of the
various agencies and particular cases where the agencies
differ. In addition, we will explore the issue of whether
S&P or Moody's tends to be more lenient than MCM, the
rating agency that is not compensated by the companies it
analyzes.
3.1 RATING AGENCIES
Exhibit 3.1 lists some summary data of the various
rating agencies.
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It is clear that Moody's and S&P's are the dominant
firms in the industry. They clearly rate the highest
number of issues and have the largest staff to provide
accurate surveillance. Casual conversations with a few
investment managers and investment bankers indicates that
when marketing a particular corporate issue, only S&P and
Moody's ratings are typically given. It seems that the
only time the other ratings services are consulted is when
inconsistency exists between the two major rating
services. In the vast majority of cases however, the top
two rating agencies concur with each other or differ by
one category. For example, among 33 industrial companies
at the end of 1975, S&P and Moody's agreed on ratings for
29 AAA companies. S&P gave a AAA to four companies which
Moody's only rated AA.
One of the notable occasions when S&P and Moody's
differed in their ratings was during the breakup of AT&T.
In March 1983, Moody's slashed its ratings for AT&T and
most of its subsidiaries two full grades, from AAA to A.
They cited uncertainties stemming from the breakup of the
Bell system scheduled in 1984. S&P, however, maintained
AT&T's AAA rating because "it continues to demonstrate
that it can obtain sufficient rate relief under
restrictive state regulatory conditions to produce
earnings protection and capitalization measure fully
-35-
consistent with its AAA rating."-5 The difference in
ratings category could mean significantly higher interest
costs for new issues, depending upon the market's
evaluation of the actual credit risk. Because AT&T's debt
accounts for approximately 10X of all the bonds
outstanding in the U.S., the difference of the opinions of
S&P and Moody's analysts have enormous ramifications.
This represents the classic example of when a third rating
agency is important. In this case, both Duff & Phelps and
Fitch reaffirmed S&P's opinion and kept AT&T in their top
ratings category. As it turned out, AT&T bonds actually
traded near AAA level; however, prices dropped somewhat
upon Moody's decision to downgrade.
3.2 GENERAL REPUTATIONS
Investment bankers generally regard S&P to be number
one in the field of corporate debt rating. It employs the
highest number of corporate analysts, has the largest
number of subscribers to its ratings publication, and it
rates every corporate issue that comes to market. Moody's
had long held a dominant position in the ratings of
municipalities but because of high turnover in its ranks
to research firms on Wall Street, its dominant position
has faded. Moody's is often considered the more
conservative of the two big ratings agencies, emphasizing
-36-
traditional measures such as debt burdens and ratios in
making ratings decisions. S&P gives more weight to
economic trends.
The other smaller SEC-recognized firms are competing
aggressively to be number three. Following the near
collapse of New York City bonds in the municipal markets
and the default of Washington Power Supply System (WPSS)
bonds in 1983, smaller firms gained considerable demand as
investors desired more second and third opinions.
Of the three smaller agencies, Duff & Phelps has been
around the longest, issuing ratings since the 1940s. It
was recently acquired by Security Pacific Bank and
observers contend that it may now have a deeper resource
base than its competitors. Duff & Phelps charges both
issuers and investors for its ratings services and is
known to emphasize an issuer's future more than its
competitors do. One weakness of Duff & Phelps (and other
smaller rating services) is that they only rate the
largest bond issuers. Other services that it provides
include investment seminars and personalized investment
counseling.
Fitch differs from the other rating agencies in that
it takes fees only from issuers. It also has a reputation
-37-
for liberal (higher) ratings; however, its ratings have
become more conservative (lower) since a change in
management in 1978.
McCarthy, Chrisanti and Maffei (MCM) represents the
opposite extreme because it charges only investors,
therefore claiming to be the only firm without a conflict
of interest. However, investors and issuers criticize MCM
for rarely meeting with the issuers it rates. Furthermore,
it is the only agency that does not allow a company that
is being rated for the first time an opportunity to refuse
or appeal a rating.
Philip T. Maffei, President of MCM says that investors
should wonder about the other agencies: "They're getting
paid by the people they grade." Its ratings tend to be
lower because the agency focuses on the vulnerability of a
company's industry and its ability to deal with adversity.
The only other competition to the ratings agencies
comes from research departments which have recently
developed on Wall Street. These departments were first
developed as a result of skepticism on the timeliness of
the rating agencies, but later these research departments
were seen as a marketing tool. By providing investors
with accurate and timely information as assessed by
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well-regarded industry specialists, Wall Street firms
advise their clients on the creditworthiness and
attractiveness of various fixed income securities.
Practially every notable Wall Street firm has established
fixed income research departments complete with rating
capabilities. Achieving recognition for accurate and
timely credit assessments in Institutional Investor's
All-American research team is considered a major objective
of these analysts. With all of the different analysts now
rating securities and supplying this information to
institutional investors, when S&P or Moody's changes a
rating, there is practically a negligible effect on those
6/bond prices.-
Critics of the Wall Street research firms claim a
conflict of interest exists. We contend that a conflict
of interest must exist because the same company that is
advising a client on the creditworthiness of an issue
derive the majority of its revenues from the sale of those
securities?
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3.3 IS S&P OR MOODY'S MORE LENIENT THAN MCM?
MCM, and some Wall Street analysts, claim that most
rating agencies (other than MCM) face a conflict of
interest because they are compensated by the bond
issuers. They claim that S&P and Moody's will tend to be
more lenient in their ratings than MCM because those
issuers provide revenue to those agencies.
Jay Miller from MCM provides us with information to
support the above claims. In making the appropriate
comparison, we first reduce the universe of securities to
those commonly rated by all three. This represents 375
companies in 1979 and increases to 403 in 1985.
The second step was to convert the appropriate letter
ratings to numerical equivalents, as follows:
DEBT RATINGS NUMERICAL EQUIVALENT
Moody's S & P MCM
Aaa AAA AAA 0
Aal AA+ AA+ 2
Aa2 AA AA 3
Aa3 AA- AA- 4
Al A+ A+ 5
A2 A A 6
A3 A- A- 7
Baal BBB+ BBB+ 8
Baa2 BB BBB 9
Baa3 BB- BBB- 10
Bal BB+ BB+ 11
Ba2 BB BB 12
Ba3 BB- BB- 13
B* B* B 15
* Includes all ratings below this level.
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By assigning these numbers to the composite of bonds
rated, we can determine a weighted average of the
composite corporate bond ratings (see Exhibit 3.2). As
one can readily see, both S&P and Moody's have a
consistently lower weighted composite (representing more
lenient, higher ratings) than MCM. This finding supports
MCM's claim of being more conservative in its ratings. A
composite ratings graph is displayed in Exhibit 3.3. What
is also noticeable in the graph in Exhibit 3.3 is that the
spread between MCM and both S&P and Moody's has narrowed
over time from 1.65 (average of S&P and Moody's spread
from MCM) in 1979 to 1.08 in 1985. The narrowing of this
spread perhaps indicates that MCM may have recognized
certain macroeconomic trends before S&P or Moody's.
Exhibit 3.4 displays the ratings spread and how it has
declined. Another suggestion that is implied in both
graphs is the fact that S&P and Moody's ratings rarely
differ. Although these figures are composites and
therefore conceal differences in the ratings, it is
interesting to note that the average difference in the
composite ratings between S&P and Mody's was only 0.097.
We also examine the ratings of telephone company debt
when the top two agencies' ratings differed significantly.
This was for AT&T in 1982 and 1983, during the breakup.
The data for approximately 50 telephone utility ratings
-41-
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common to the three agencies was gathered and graphed in
Exhibit 3.5. It is interesting to note how far both S&P
and Moody's telephone ratings diverged from one another in
comparison with how closely tied they were in the
composite.
These graphs and data seem to lend support to MCM's
claim that perhaps S&P and Moody's have a conflict of
interst and may tend to over-rate its issuers. We tend to
disagree with this claim, however, because it is their
objective, unbiased opinions that have enabled these firms
to reach the level of significance and dominance they now
have. As former vice president of S&P, Leo O'Neil states:
"The cornerstone of our credibility is our
objectivity. Without that, we are out of
business. To believe that we would
imperil our objectivity for a fee which is
relatively nominal is, to me,
incredulous. "7/
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE EFFECTS OF BOND RATING CHANGES ON BOND PRICES
4.1 Introduction and Overview
A number of studies have been conducted on the effect
of a bond rating change in the capital markets. Chapter 4
focuses on the effect of the announcement of rating
changes on bond prices. Chapter 5 then concentrates on
the effects of bond rating changes on stock prices.
Because of the differing conclusions regarding the
informational value of rating changes, we then perform our
own simple analysis to examine the stock market reaction
to recent rating changes. Unfortunately, we were unable
to obtain an adequate source of bond price data to perform
a similar test for the bond market.
Intuition would lead one to believe that a bond rating
upgrade would tend to raise bond prices; and conversely, a
bond rating downgrade would tend to lower bond prices
(assuming constant interest rates). The assumption
underlying this intuition is that bond rating changes do
provide new information to the market. The market then
reacts appropriately to this information with the bond
-47-
price moving in the direction of the rating change. An
alternative hypothesis is that the market is efficient and
that rating changes do not provide any new information to
the market. This hypothesis contends that any new
information reflected in a rating change will have already
been recognized by the market and that the bond price will
have previously adjusted accordingly. This chapter
reviews some of the studies which have analyzed this issue.
4.2 Analysis of Previous Bond Price Research
1. Steven Katz: "The Price Adjustment of Bonds to Rating
Reclassifications: A Test of Bond Market Efficiency"
(1974)
Katz analyzes the price adjustment process of bonds to
ratings reclassification by looking for "unusual behavior"
in a bond's yield to maturity twelve months prior to and
five months following a rating change.
Methodology:
Regression models are used to forecast the expected
yield to maturity of a reclassified bond for both its old
and new rating class. Forecasts are made for each of the
eighteen months considered. Actual yields to maturity are
then compared to both the old and new ratings category
predictions for each month.
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Data
The data collected to develop the various regression
models include electric utility bond prices from 1966 to
1972. This industry was chosen because it had homogeneous
operating characteristics and therefore qualitative
differences among companies within the industry would be
reflected in a consistent fashion in bond yields. One
hundred fifteen bonds representing 66 different utility
companies whose ratings were changed in the 1966-1972 time
period were analyzed to determine the bond price
adjustment mechanism and how it corresponds to the timing
of rating changes. Regression models were developed
reflecting the bond price data for each month and for the
four different rating categories--AAA, AA, A, and B.
Results
Katz' finds that the market does not anticipate a
public announcement of a bond reclassification. In
addition, he finds that a slight lag exists in the
adjustment process following public announcement of the
rating change with the entire price adjustment occurring
6-10 weeks following reclassification. Because of this,
Katz therefore concludes that there is no significant
market anticipation of a rating change and that the bond
market is not efficient. Furthermore, he suggests that
little institutional research is being done to determine
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the proper credit level of bonds. Bond investors appear
to rely primarily on the pronouncement of the rating
agencies as determinants of appropriate bond value.
Katz' study implies that there is an opportunity for
profitable bond trading immediately following rating
changes. A bond upgrading would correspond to an
immediate purchase of that particular bond to be resold
later at a profit. Likewise, a downgraded bond could be
sold short, generating a profit as the price eventually
declines. His study therefore supports the hypothesis
that the creation in the mid-1970s of the various fixed
income research departments on Wall Street could lead to a
more efficient bond market as investors receive more
timely information.
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2. Hettenhouse and Sartoris: "An Analysis of the
Informational Value of Bond Rating Changes," (1976)
In this analysis Hettenhouse and Sartoris tested the
efficiency of the bond market and whether or not bond
rating changes provide informational value to the
financial markets.
Methodology
Hettenhouse and Sartoris devised an index which
monitors the response of market yields through time using
an average of yields for similarly rated utility bonds as
a control group. The index was calculated as follows:
XT = (YBondT - "Bar /(¥BAR - YBARi T )T InT outT inT
where
YbondT the actual yield to maturity for the bond
whose rating is changed;
YBARin the average Y.T.M. for the ratings categoryin
for which the bond was changed into.
¥BARout - the average Y.T.M. for the rating category
which the bond was in originally.
If the market is truly efficient in absorbing the
information that caused the rating change, the yield on
the bond should approximate the average yield of the
rating category into which it is being placed. If this is
the case, the average numerator of the index would be 0.
On the other hand, if the bond market is inefficient and
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adjustment in yields occurs at a later time, the yield on
the changed bond should approximate the average yield in
the original rating category. The average numerator would
approximately equal the yield difference between the two
ratings categories and therefore the index would equal
approximately one.
Data
The bonds included in this study represent all public
utility company bonds that incorporated a rating chaage
either by S&P or Moody's between 1963 and 1973. The
analysis was restricted to onds rated A or above by both
of the agencies. Data was collected and analyzed on these
bonds for a timeframe spanning from six months before to
six months following a rating reclassification. The
average yield for each respective ratings category was
based upon a large sample taken from S&P's Bond Guide of
seasoned bonds having a relatively long maturity.
Results
The conclusion of this study is that bond rating
changes provide very little informational value to the
financial market. For bonds that have been downgraded,
price adjustments have been made in the market in advance
of the announcement of the ratings change. For upgraded
bonds the price adjustment appears somewhat slower as the
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market seems somewhat skeptical of positive upgrading
potential. In either case, however, the market shift as a
results of the reclassification was generally less than
the yield differential implied by the average yields for
the two ratings categories involved.
This study therefore implies that the bond market is
sufficiently efficient to be able to set prices
independent of the major rating agencies. There is no
support then for the hypothesis that ratings changes can
be used as a vehicle for adjusting portfolio strategies.
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3. Grier and Katz "The Differential Effects of Bond
Rating Changes Among Industrial and Public Utility
Bonds by Maturity (1976)
In this study, Grier and Katz investigated the semi-
strong efficient nature of the bond market. The semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis as defined
by Fama tests whether all available public information is
fully reflected in bond prices. In particular, they
evaluate whether at the time of public announcement of a
bond rating reclassification, information was rapidly
reflected in bond market prices.
Methodology
Grier and Katz collected price data for two different
sets of industrial and public utility bonds. In the test
set they placed bonds whose ratings had been downgraded
between 1966 and 1972. They followed price behavior of
these bonds during the four months prior to and three
months following the month of rating reclassification. A
control group of bonds similar in all respects to the
first group of bonds in terms of maturity, etc. was then
gathered. The only difference in the two groups was that
the bonds in the first group had experienced rating
downgrades. The control group was established to
segregate the effects of bond price adjustments due to
shifts in interest rates or sector-specific credit
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considerations from changes in specific bond prices as a
result of reclassification.
The price adjustments of the test and control. bonds
were analyzed for four months prior and three months
following a ratings change. Comparisons were then made in
terms of absolute price differences and percentage price
differences for the study group and the control group.
Results
Grier and Katz found that for the combined study
(industrial and utilities), the dollar price differential
between the test and control bonds for the month of rating
reclassification is $7.25 four months prior to downgrading
to $4.75 in the month prior to the rating change. Thus,
the market does anticipate, to a slight degree, a ratings
change. However, the average price fell another $8.07 for
the three months following the ratings change. Overall,
80X of the total price drop occurs in the month of and the
three months following a rating downgrade. Clearly a bond
rating change represents a significant piece of
information to the market. This new information is
anticipated somewhat; however, it is certainly not
instantaneously absorbed.
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In addition, Grier and Katz evaluated whether a
profitable trading strategy could be developed based upon
bond reclassifications. They concluded that when trading
transactions costs are considered, these strategies (short
selling for downgrades) are no longer significantly
profitable.
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4. Weinstein: "The Effect of a Rating Change
Announcement on Bond Price" (1978)
This study examines the behavior of corporate bond
prices during the period surrounding a rating change
announcement to determine whether rating changes have any
information content. Weinstein claims that his analysis
improves upon previous studies by incorporating stricter
statistical analysis and eliminating much of the biases in
the sample data previously used. Specifically, Weinstein's
sample covers a random sample including both utility and
industrial bonds. It also covers both ratings' increases
and decreases, and concentrates on monthly holding period
returns as opposed to yields.
Methodology
Weinstein uses concepts developed in modern portfolio
theory to measure unexpected returns during various
periods surrounding a rating change. In his analysis he
assumes that bond ratings can be used as a proxy for
systematic risk and bond beta (). He then estimates a
series of risk-adjusted returns for each bond by
subtracting the return on the appropriate rating class
portfolio from the return on each particular bond. The
effect of this was to generate a return series that has
been adjusted for risk by using a benchmark portfolio.
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Abnormal returns were then analyzed for the timeframes
surrounding a rating change.
Data
The study considers monthly returns for 132 different
debt issues representing all rated bonds in June 1962. As
bonds matured or were called, new bonds entered the sample
by way of a random selection process to maintain a fixed
proportion of bonds in each rating class over time. he
effect of rating change announcements were analyzed from
July 1962 to July 1974.
Results
The results indicated that, on average, the bond
market has fully adjusted to the information contained in
rating change announcements before they actually occur. A
very minor adjustment was found to occur during the month
cf the change. The major adjustments in price were found
to occur during the period 1-1/2 to 1/2 years before the
rating change was announced. This finding supports the
semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis for
the bond market. in addition, this study contradicts
previous research--katz, and Grier and Katz--which observe
bond price adjustments following the announcement of the
rating change.
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5. Wakeman: "The Function of Bond Rating Agencies:
Theory and Evidence" (1981)
Wakeman represents a fifth academic to analyze the
competing hypothesis concerning bond market efficiency.
He claims to provide a more detailed analysis than
previous studies.
Methodology
Wakeman analyzes the effects of bond rating change
announcements on bond prices. He first eliminates from
his sample those companies which may have pre-announced to
the market confounding events such as mergers, tender
offers, stock splits, etc. Weekly returns were then
analyzed for abnormal returns occurring for the period 24
months prior and 6 months following a rating change
announcement.
Data
After excluding all "flagged" (i.e., merger, tender
offer pending, etc.) Moody's rating changes for the period
1961-1969, a sample of 133 companies was analyzed. This
sample included 61 companies with 85 upgraded bonds (33
industrial, 36 transportation, and 16 utility) and 72
companies representing 113 downgraded bonds (50
industrial, 34 transportation, and 29 utility).
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Results
Wakeman's findings were consistent with Weinstein's
(1977) findings. The residual returns in the month of
change, as well as the six months following the rating
change were insignificantly different from 0. This
provides further support for the hypothesis that bond
rating changes provide no new information to the bond
market. For the timeframe preceding the ratings change,
the results differ slightly for upgraded bonds and
downgraded bonds. Upgraded
bonds were found to have significantly positive abnormal
returns between 24 and 12 months prior to the rating
change. Downgraded bonds were found to have significantly
negative abnormal returns somewhat closer to the rating
change data, that is, 12 to 6 months prior.
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Summary and Recommendations for Future Research
The various studies reviewed in this chapter differed
significantly in their results concerning efficiency in
the bond market. The results of each study are
highlighted in the following table:
AUTHOR (Year) MAIN CONCLUSION
Katz (1974)
Hettenhouse &
Sartoris (1976)
Grier and
Katz (1976)
Weinstein (1977)
Wakeman (1981)
Bond market is inefficient. The bond
market lags in adjusting to utility
bond re-ratings by 6-10 weeks.
Bond market is basically efficient.
Utility bond re-ratings contained
very little informational value.
Price adjustments for upgrades appear
somewhat slower than for downgrades.
Bond market is inefficient. After
examining both utility and industrial
bond downgrades beeween 1966 and
1972, they conclude that "this new
information is not instantaneously
absorbed."
Bond market is efficient. He found
no abnormal returns following a
ratings change. Furthermore, the
price adjustments occurred 1-1/2 to
1/2 years prior to rating
reclassification.
Bond market is efficient. Residuals
following a rating change were
insignificantly different than 0.
For upgrades, significant abnormal
returns were obtained from 24 to 12
months prior. For downgrades, 12-6
months prior.
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It is interesting to note the differences in
conclusions of the above studies. The different data and
methodologies used may have caused some of those
differences.
It seems that a more direct method of testing the
efficiency hypothesis than those utilized in previous
research would incorporate "spreads" over Treasuries.
Most bonds are traded in the market with primary
consideration given to basis point "spreads" over the
appropriate risk-free Treasury issue. This spread
reflects credit risk considerations. By following the
changes in this spread and how it corresponds to spreads
for the appropriate sector within the bond market, one can
eliminate interest rate effects as well as sector-specific
effects. We can then concentrate specifically upon bond
market reaction to rating changes. Unfortunately, we are
unaware of a publicly available database which accurately
contains daily bond prices, bond yields, and "spreads"
over Treasuries.
-62-
CHAPTER 5
THE EFFECTS OF BOND RECLASSIFICATION
ON EQUITY PRICES
5.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In this chapter we focus upon common stock price
adjustments to bond rating changes. The principal
articles used in this section are Pinches and Singleton
(1978), Wakeman (1982), and Griffen and Sanvincente
(1982). We then perform our own analysis upon the effect
of a bond rating change on stock prices. We specifically
concentrate on lower-rated bonds which are not as often
followed.
5.2 ANALYSIS OF PREVIOUS COMMON STOCK PRICE RESEARCH
Pinches and Singleton: "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to
Bond Rating Changes" (1978)
Hypotheses:
1) In an efficient market, does a bond rating change
possess new information that investors have not
already discounted?
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2) What is the average rate changing lag? I.e., the
difference between the time investors' actions signify
their recognition of significant changes in the
prospects of the firm (as evidenced by abnormal
residuals) and the time the rating agency changes the
firm's bond rating?
3) Is there a difference in the rate changing lag when a
company-specific event occurs simultaneously with the
rating change? (i.e., new debt or equity financing,
retirement of debt or equity financing, retirement of
debt, merger, etc.) occurs simultaneously with the
rating change?
Hypothesis Overview
For a rating change to possess new information for
investors, bond rating agencies must be able to predict
changes in the financial position of a bond-issuing firm
prior to investors' recognition of these changes. Hence,
if there is a significant lag between changes in a firm's
financial position and the actual bond rating change, the
rating agencies are doing a poor job of disseminating
accurate and timely information.
As previously mentioned in this paper, bond rating
agencies continuously re-evaluate firms as part of their
normal review process schedule. This schedule can be
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moved up, however, when a company-specific event occurs.
We should therefore expect that firms experiencing a
"company-specific" event should have lower rate changing
lags compared to firms not experiencing company-specific
events.
Methodology
The authors, using an amended capital asset pricing
model, generated the unexpected monthly stock returns for
individual securities. This analysis was undertaken from
thirty months prior to a bond rating change and to twelve
months following the change.
Sample Characteristics
Moody's Investor Services was used for the research
for bonds either upgraded or downgraded during 1950-1972.
The conditions for sample selection were:
1) the bond must have been outstanding at least 18
months before the change.
2) the bond remained outstanding at least 10 months
after the change.
3) no other bond rating change occurred within 18
months before the change and 12 months after the
change.
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In accordance with the above criteria, only 207 bond
rating changes were examined.
Results
1) Average residuals were larger for firms experiencing
bond rating upgrades as compared to downgrades.
2) The average residuals for the upgrades (downgrades)
were larger (smaller) for the time period before the
rating change compard to the period after the rating
change. Hence, the stock market recognized the
improvement (deterioration) in the financial position
of the firm before the bond ratings were changed by
the rating agencies. This seems to lend support to
the hypothesis of efficiency in the capital markets.
In addition, Pinches and Singleton estimated the rate
changing lag to be 1-1/2 years for all increases and
15 months for decreases in the absence of company-
specific events. The rate changing lag was less than
six months when company-specific events triggered
investigations which were followed by bond rating
reclassifications.
Thus, there is apparently no opportunity for profitable
trading subsequent to the announcement of a rating
change. These results indicate that rating agencies
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provide minimal information to investors. As we have
mentioned previously, this suggests that the
information was previously disseminated by some of the
Wall Street firms or private analysis performed by the
investors.
Problems With the Study
Daily stock prices offer a more accurate reading and
should have been used instead of monthly prices. Also, in
attempting to obtain a homogeneous group of bond samples,
the research left out rating changes associated with
initial public offering of bonds during their first 18
months, and also bonds which eventually defaulted. These
two cases are periods in which investors are the most
reliant on rating agencies for information. These two
cases should have been included instead of just focusing
on well-known, long-established bonds where investors can
more easily monitor the financial condition of the firms.
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GRIFFIN and SANVINCENTE, "Common Stock Returns and Rating
Changes: A Methodological Comparison" (1982)
Hypothesis
Does a bond reclassification significantly impact
common stock prices?
Hypothesis Overview
This research further explores the common stock price
adjustments due to bond rating changes, as earlier
examined by Pinches and Singleton in 1978. Pinches and
Singleton had used a fairly simple residual time series
model to measure differences between stock prices for a
firm compared to the market average. In this study,
Griffin and Sanvincente used two measures of security
price performance together with a portfolio estimation
procedure.
Methodology
The approaches used for measuring abnormal security
price adjustments were:
1) A derived security residual return from a one-factor
market model involving a comparison of the conditional
and unconditional expected means. This method
compared expected stock returns with expected stock
returns given an upgrading (downgrading).
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2) A derived security residual return from a two-factor
market model similar to model 1.
3) Estimates of the abnormal price adjustments for a
given firm in a portfolio as the difference between
the actual return on the stock and the return on a
matched control firm.
Sample
Both Moody's and S&P's rating changes were used for
this research during the period 1960-1975. The time
period analyzed was eleven months before and during the
month of bond rating change announcement. The final
sample consisted of 180 bond reclassifications.
Results
Based on the several different measures of abnormal
security return, the authors find statistically
significant stock price reaction to bond downgradings in
the month of announcement. For bond upgradings, however,
the price adjustments were statistically insignificant in
the month of announcement. However, for the preceding
eleven months, upgraded firms experienced positive
abnormal returns.
One of the problems with this study is that it fails
to follow stock price adjustments for a timeframe following
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the rating change. We may, in fact, find that investors
are cautious in adjusting such portfolios based upon rating
changes. They may prefer to await additional information
regarding the long-run profitability of the stock.
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WLKEMAN: "The Function of Bond Rating Agencies: Theory
and Evidence" (1981)
Hypothesis: Bond rating agencies provide new information
to the capital markets.
Methodology: A market portfolio of non-rating-changed
firms was constructed to calculate the abnormal common
stock returns of firms which experienced bond rating
changes. The analysis covered a period both before and
after a rating change. Abnormal was defined as the
difference between the actual return recorded and the
return expected by the estimation model for a given
holding period.
Sample: The sample consisted of all Moody's bond rating
changes during the period of 1950 to 1976. Entities which
experienced a merger or a stock split were removed from
the analysis. Industrials, transportations, and
municipalities were all used in this paper. The study
covered the period of approximately two years before the
rating change and up to one year after the change.
Results: The calculated residual returns for the stocks
surrounding the month of rating change were statistically
insignificant. Hence, bond rating adjustments provided no
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new information to both the stock and bond markets.
Therefore, both of these markets are efficient.
Wakeman's study seems better than the other two
articles reviewed in this chapter. His study provided the
same results in both the stock and bond markets. His main
conclusion is that bond rating changes provide very little
new information to the bond market. The downside feature
of his paper is that all types of bonds are aggregated in
his sample. Clearly, industrials and utilities trade and
are priced differently by the market. Once again, an
investor seeking sector-specific advice from this report
would receive only a composite macro view about bond
rating changes.
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5.3 MIGLIOZZI AND SAPONARO STUDY (1986)
Since the results of previous studies are conflicting,
we have conducted our own study to analyze common stock
adjustments to bond rating changes. Instead of examining
the universe of bonds and generating a macro conclusion,
we focus attention on low-grade industrial bonds which
experienced a bond rating change during 1985. Most
previous research had uses higher-grade bonds which are
more routinely followed.
Using bond rating changes as an investment guide--an
upgrade (downgrade) would trigger a purchase (short sale)
of the respective common stock. Since information on this
sample is provided by both Moody's and S&P, this study
will analyze the opportunities for profitable trading
based upon rating reclassification agreed upon by the two
agencies.
The sample we used consists of rating changes for 36
below-investment grade industrial bonds representing all
such changes occurring in 1985. Three bonds were removed
subsequently from the sample (SCOA Ind. became a private
company and GAF/Union Carbide were involved in a takeover
battle which we did not want to confound results). Of the
33 remaining bonds, 7 were upgrades, while 26 were
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downgrades. For 5 of the 7 upgrades, Moody's announced
its rating change earlier than S&P. For the 26
downgrades, Moody's also made its rating adjustments prior
to S&P 70% of the time. It was interesting to observe
that the two rating agencies never made a rating change on
the same day. The difference in days between the rating
agencies decisions varied from one day (three times) to
six months and 23 days. This lends support to the claim
that S&P and Moody's do not merely react to one another's
conclusions.
Unexpected stock returns were then calculated for the
sample firms using the S&P 400 Industrial Index as a
benchmark for the expected return. Unexpected returns
represented the difference beween the return on the
spedific stock (stock of company with debt
reclassification) and return on the market (S&P 400):
(URjt Rjt - Rmt). Unexpected returns are
calculated for a 2-day and a 30-day period subsequent to a
rating change. These periods offer both an immediate and
somewhat longer-term analysis of the impact of a rating
change.
Results
Because only 7 bonds received upgrades from both
agencies, the upgrade sample was not large enough to
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qualify for any test of significance. Because of this,
our comments will concentrate on the 26 downgrades.
For the periods analyzed, a significant unexpected
return for the stock would signify that the bond rating
agency did provide new information to the market. The
results of our analysis are shown in Exhibit 5.1. Both
agencies recorded negative unexpected returns for the
2-day and the 30-day periods. The 2-day unexpected
returns recorded were -1.0% and -1.4% for S&P and Moody's,
respectively. The post 30-day unexpected returns were
-8.4% (S&P) and -6.9% (Moody's). These numbers are much
higher than anticipated. Clearly, the market in this case
is not displaying efficiency. Furthermore, profitable
trading strategies can be devised to take advantage of
this inefficiency.
One reason for our unusual results is that our sample
is small and certainly was not random, particularly
because it only considered low-rated debt. Low-rated debt
would tend to correspond to higher beta stock firms which
will over-represent results when betas are not
considered. In addition, during the latter half of 1985,
the stock market experienced a significant rally from a
Dow of approximately 1250 to over 1600. Again, depending
upon the betas of the stocks in our sample, the residuals
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could have been made exceptionally large during this bull
market. Also, we believe that depending upon the reason
of the bond rating change, expected affects upon stock
prices could differ. Stock prices reflect more
appropriately the long-run profitability of the company.
Certain aspects of this stock value assessment may not be
reflected in bond ratings.
For the few upgrades e did examine, our results were
even more unusual. For upgrades, our stock prices actually
declined by 5.9% for S&P and 1.5% for Moody's over 30 days.
We again attribute this to the non-random selection and
the smaller number of companies included. For example,
Western Airlines, included in our sample, may not have
experienced stock price fluctuations related to the bond
rating change. The recent merger mania in the airline
industry may have accounted for the unusual price movement
of this stock.
Conclusions
Although our study was inadequate in terms of size and
randomness, we feel that the unusual results obtained
warrant further study for both stock and bond market
efficiency in the junk bond sector. The simple methodology
we incorporated provides a structure for future studies to
analyze the effects of these changes during the month of
rating reclassification.
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Exhibit 5.1
Returns from Rating Changes
Downgrades:
(26 Companies)
2-Day unexpected (avg.)
-0.010
Moodys -0.014
30-day unexpected (avg.)
-0.084
-0.069
Upgrades:
(7 Companies)
2-Day unexpected (avg.)
-0.007S&P
30-day unexpected (avg.)
-0.059
-0. 015
S&P
0.007Moodys
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
This paper examines the function of bond rating
agencies and the effects of a bond rating change on
security prices.
In Chapter I, we reviewed the players involved in the
bond ratings game and the significance of a strong credit
rating. We concluded that S&P and Moody's are by far the
top two rating agencies, while three other firms are
battling for third. We further concluded that the primary
significance of a bond rating is that it represents
probability of default which therefore will affect both
interest cost and marketability of the issue.
Chapters II and III analyzed the criteria considered
in determining a rating classification, concluding that
the various agencies consider similar criteria and factors
in what appears to be a qualitative judgment. This
qualitative judgment is supported and determined by a
variety of quantitative analyses. We also found that
certain rating agencies may have a conflict of interest in
determining their ratings.
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In our final chapters, we examined the informational
value of bond rating changes in both the debt and equity
markets. The results of previous research on this topic
have offered conflicting results about both informational
value of bond rating changes and market efficiency. Based
on our focused common stock return study, it appears that
bond rating changes do provide information to the market.
While earlier studies have included the universe of bonds
to calculate abnormal and unexpected security returns, our
study focused upon rating changes involving below-
investment-grade debt. These types of securities are less
popular (because of restrictions) and followed by fewer
investors than the well-known, top rated securities. In
our study, a trading strategy based upon rating downgrades
during 1985 have produced 30-day unexpected stock returns
of -8.4% and -6.9% for S&P and Moody's, respectively.
Much of this, however, can be attributed to the non-
randomness and small size of our sample.
Clearly, this study indicates that future research is
warranted to provide a better understanding of the
relationship between bond rating changes and stock and
bond price reactions. Also, specific sectors of the bond
market should be analyzed to determine which sectors are
efficient and which are not, rather than a composite
analysis.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Wakeman, L.M., "The Function of Bond Rating Agencies:
Theory and Evidence," University of Rochester,
September 1981, p.4.
2. W. Braddock Hickman, "Corporate Bond Quality and
Investor Experience," Princeton University Press, for
the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958, pp.
139-210.
3. Wakeman, L.M., "The Real Function of Bond Rating
Agencies," p. 26.
3b. Standard and Poors Credit Overview, 1982.
4. Belkaoui, A., oP. cit., p. 56.
5. Wall Street Journal, "AT&T's South Central Gets Top
S&P Rating on New Debt Offering," March 24, 1983, p.
25.
6. Broy, Anthony, "How Good Are the Ratings Agencies?",
Financial World, September 1, 1976, p. 14.
7. Ibid, p. 15.
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